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THE DEVIL IS IN ALL THE DETAILS
(NOT JUST IN GEORGIA)
MICHELLE KUNDMUELLER*
ABSTRACT
In this article I present a detailed examination of the task of
understanding historical state law on freedom of religion and, with
regard to the specific state of Georgia, demonstrate that the Supreme
Court has gone astray in each of its attempts to use the state's legal
history. The most resounding lesson to be learned from Georgia's
history and the cases that rely upon it is that if the Court is to rely on
state history at all in its interpretation of the Constitution, it must do so
based on a more thorough understanding of that history. To do less is to
risk multiplying the inaccuracies and unsupported assertions brought to
light in this article. The obstacles to correctly marshaling state history in
support of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Religion Clauses of
the United States Constitution are great, and the risks inherent in
inadequate use of history are greater yet. Under the current
circumstances, the Court should leave state legal history to the history
books and pursue less onerous approaches to interpretation of the
Religion Clauses. In this particular situation, a little history is indeed
worse than none at all.
* 2014-2015 Jack Miller Center Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Notre
Dame; Ph.D. (Political Science), University of Notre Dame, 2014; associate at
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INTRODUCTION
This article assesses the Supreme Court's use of Georgia's legal
history in interpreting the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution. This evaluation has two primary
purposes. First, this article demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
attempts to use Georgia legal history have resulted in misleading and
often incorrect applications of Georgia law. Second, using Georgia as an
example, this paper will highlight the inherent obstacles, such as the size
and complexity of the task relative to the Court's resources, to using state
legal history as a tool in interpreting the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.'
1. In pointing to the obstacles inherent in such a quest, I mean not to declare it
futile but rather to explore the complexity and consequent size of the task, and the
resources necessary to make interpretation successful.
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The relevance of this exploration of Georgia's legal history and the
Court's misuse thereof is not limited to the Religion Clauses. Reliance
on state law is a common interpretive tool for state constitutions with
parallel or near parallel provisions, and it also occurs-albeit in less
complex form-when a federal statute that is similar to state statutes
proves difficult to interpret. Indeed, whenever federal courts consult
state law and history as an aid to interpretation of national law, they are
inevitably faced with obstacles similar to those which are analyzed here
in the context of the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Georgia
history.
Ultimately, I argue that the best method of correcting the Court's
current approach is a deeper understanding of law, history, and politics.
Because the Court has limited resources at its disposal, however, it
cannot currently marshal a competent command of the legal histories of
all the states relevant to the interpretation of the Religion Clauses.
Therefore, the Court should abandon the use of state legal history as an
interpretive tool unless and until better resources become available.
To uncover this flaw inherent in the Court's contemporary
approach to the Religion Clauses, the Constitution, and national law
more generally, I focus on a small but important portion of the total state
legal history relevant to the interpretation of the Religion Clauses. Over
the past 53 years, the Court has relied on the legal history of Georgia five
2
times when interpreting the Religion Clauses. The Court reached the
incorrect result each time. These misapplications of Georgia law have
often been in landmark cases, such as those deciding the constitutionality
of Sunday closing law, public school prayer, ' religious holiday
5 6displays,5 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In each of these
five cases, the Court also examined the history of the other original
states,7 and the history of Georgia was not disproportionately important
2. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Engel v.Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
3. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 420.
4. Engel, 370 U.S. at 421.
5. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573.
6. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
7. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 487 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Engel, 370 U.S. at
428-29 (1962); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., concurring in part); Boerne,
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to the Court's ultimate holding. Rather than arguing the particular
importance of Georgia--or of the Court's mistakes with regard to
Georgia-I use Georgia as a case study to illustrate how fundamental
limitations of the Court interplay with the complexities of legal history to
severely limit the Court's ability to correctly apply state legal history
from the relevant era in any state. Georgia legal history and its use by
the Supreme Court in cases interpreting the Religion Clauses constitute a
small piece of evidence which points to a larger problem.
I focus on Georgia, one of the less-discussed states in
relationship to interpretation of the Religion Clauses because, as much as
the size of the research question is an obstacle to the Court's use of state
history, it stands likewise as an obstacle to scholars who critique the
Court's use of that history. Fortunately, as a scholar one may simplify
the task for the sake of accuracy. Simplifying the task to a thirteenth of
that faced by the Supreme Court, it becomes possible to flesh out the
difficulties in one state that plague the analysis of all states. Indeed, a
generalized or aggregate article on state legal history would necessarily
make the same mistakes as those I highlight here. Therefore, I present
what might plausibly be called "minutia" from one state for the purpose
of shedding light upon the cumulative effect of such mistakes in all
states. If, upon the close scrutiny offered herein, it appears that the
Supreme Court has yet to apply Georgia legal history correctly even
once, what reason is there to think that the histories of the other twelve
original states have fared any better? How many states' histories must be
thus mishandled before the Court's conclusions should be considered
without sufficient historical support?
At the very least, analysis of Georgia's history and the Court's
use thereof strongly indicate (1) that Georgia legal history has been
inaccurately relied on and (2) that further research is needed to verify the
legal history from the other twelve states that the Court has relied on in
opinions applying the Religion Clauses. This, in turn, points to the need
for further research on the accuracy of the state legal history relied upon
by the Court in the many areas of constitutional and federal law
interpretation to which it is currently being applied.
521 U.S. at 538-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 554
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Locke, 540 U.S. at 723.
[Vol. 13
THE DEVIL IN ALL THE DETAILS
I. THE SUPREME COURT, THE RELIGION CLAUSES, AND
STATE HISTORY
The Religion Clauses of the United States Constitution have
proven notoriously difficult to interpret and apply.8 In the 132 years
since the Supreme Court rendered its first Free Exercise opinion in
Reynolds v. United States,9 the Court has struggled without success to
establish a sound, workable, or lasting interpretation of either the Free
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. 10 Moreover, the
application of the Religion Clauses to state governments" has multiplied
the opportunities for misapplication, intensifying the need for a better
and more durable interpretation.
The first and most obvious cause of the difficulty of interpreting
the Religion Clauses is the text of the amendment itself: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
8. See generally Frank S. Ravitch, Rights and the Religion Clauses, 3 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 93-94 (2008) (focusing on the "shifting conception of
rights under the religion clauses between the early modern cases and the current
jurisprudence."); Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment
Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 73, 76 (2005) ("Controversy can be stoked by
the absence of clear rules, and one thing everyone agrees on is that much of the
controversy over the Establishment Clause arises because the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Clause has not been clear."); Vincent Phillip Muioz, The
Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First
Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1083, 1083 (2008) ("Despite the vast
quantity of research devoted to understanding religion and the American Founding,
the original meaning of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause remains a
matter of significant dispute.") [hereinafter Mufioz, Free Exercise Clause].
9. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
10. See Vincent Phillip Mufioz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment
Clause and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 586
(2006) ("Among contemporary scholars and jurists, in fact, less agreement exists
now about the Establishment Clause's original meaning than when the Supreme
Court first attempted to decide the matter in Everson v. Board of Education.")
[hereinafter Mufiloz, Establishment Clause]; Lee J. Strang, The (Re)turn to History in
Religion Clause Law and Scholarship, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1697, 1698 (2006)
("In order for there to be a '(Re)tum' to history, there must first be a 'turn' to
history, and this occurred in Everson v. Board of Education, the Court's first modem
application of the Establishment Clause.").
11. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162.
20141 225
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free exercise thereof." 12 The meanings of "establishment," "free
exercise," and even "religion" are not self-evident. 13 Facing this
language, the Supreme Court has looked to history for answers.14
In their historical analyses, the Court and scholars alike have
focused heavily on the Constitution's drafting notes and the writings of
the founding generation. " Yet the drafting notes from the First
Amendment, a scant five pages of inconclusive notes, can lend only
limited help.16 More troubling, even the evidence they contain does not
seem to lead to any definitive conclusions about what was meant with the
text employed. 7 Analysis of the founding generation's writings and
speeches has proved no more dispositive. As a preliminary matter-
before interpreting any contemporaneous texts-the Court must
determine whose writings are relevant and which specific documents to
12. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
13. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 550 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("As is the case for a number of the terms used in the Bill of Rights, it is
not exactly clear what the Framers thought the phrase signified.").
14. Scholars have noted the increased tendency of the Court to take a
comparatively originalist (or at least highly historically and textually informed)
approach to interpreting the Religion Clauses, particularly with regard to
Establishment Clause analysis. See Mufioz, Establishment Clause, supra note 10, at
587 n.l1 ("No aspect of constitutional law has been dominated more by
'originalism' than First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence."); Andy G.
Olree, James Madison and Legislative Chaplains, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 148
(2008) ("[T]here has been an increased interest in discovering what the Founding
generation, including those who framed and ratified the First Amendment,
understood the Establishment Clause to forbid. This concern with the original intent
behind the Establishment Clause is not new, nor is it confined to those who would
call themselves 'originalists' in matters of constitutional interpretation.").
15. Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme
Court's Use of History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563, 566 (2006)
(offering a quantitative analysis of the use of history in Supreme Court Religion
Clause cases, including an overview of its historical development and a count of the
number of appeals to various public figures, and concluding that references to
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison far outnumber references to other historical
figures).
16. Their brevity (all told they fill about five typed pages) perhaps most
forcefully conveys how little assistance they can render. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. &
EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND
OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT, 196-200
(2d ed. 2001); Muhioz, Free Exercise Clause, supra note 8, at 1100-1109.
17. See generally, Mufioz, Free Exercise Clause, supra note 8.
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use. This issue, which does not even begin to reach the substantive
question of what any particular document indicates about the Religion
Clauses, has led to significant controversy. 8 For example, Thomas
Jefferson, although not involved in the drafting process or the ratification
debate, is nonetheless cited by many as an authority for the original
meaning of the Religion Clauses-only to be denounced by others. 19
Another layer of complexity is added by the difficulty of lifting a legal or
political argument from one context, usually a state debate, and applying
it to the national debate. A policy or legal position that a statesman
advocated in one forum may have had little or nothing to do with the
policy that he thought was actually enacted by the national government.
For example, it is unclear whether the policy that James Madison
preferred in his home state equated to his position on the meaning of the
20
actual Religion Clauses as ratified by Congress.
18. In particular, there is contemporary critique of the Supreme Court's and
scholarly tendency to rely disproportionately upon the views of Jefferson and
Madison. See Stephen B. Presser, Outsiders, Swing Justices, and Original
Understanding: Can the Religion Clauses Be Saved? A Comment on Greenawalt, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 177, 179 (2004) ("[1[t is a misconstruction of history to suggest that
Madison and Jefferson's strict separationist views are those that we ought to use if
we want to be faithful to the Framers' conceptions. Curiously, Madison and
Jefferson seem often to be the only authorities among the Framers on the meaning of
the First Amendment who are cited even by some conservatives, but Madison and
Jefferson, I suspect, were actually 'outliers,' if not 'outsiders' with regard to their
strict separationist views .... ").
19. See Patrick N. Leduc, Christianity and the Framers: The True Intent of the
Establishment Clause, 5 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 201, 231-32 (2011) (pointing out that
Jefferson did not attend the Constitutional Convention or take part in the
Congressional debates on the drafting of the First Amendment and arguing that the
"Framers' general consensus that government should encourage religion, particularly
Christianity, for the good of society, which they understood was accomplished best
by getting government out of the way, conflicts with Jefferson's 'wall of separation'
analysis").
20. Kyle Duncan, Misunderstanding Freedom From Religion. Two Cents on
Madison's Three Pence, 9 NEV. L.J. 32, 32 (2008) (claiming that the Court "lifted
[Madison's] political argument from one context and applied it uncritically in a
different context and to a different issue"); Olree, supra note 14, at 152-56; Mark S.
Scarberry, John Leland and James Madison: Religious Influence on the Ratification
of the Constitution and on the Proposal of the Bill of Right, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
733,797-800 (2009).
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Even if scholars and jurists could agree upon the evidence from
which to determine the meaning of the Religion Clauses, they would not
agree upon the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Indeed,
given the complexity of these issues, combined with the difficulty of
applying original intent in a modern context, at least one scholar has
called for the minimization of a historical analysis in efforts to interpret
the Religion Clauses.21 At least in part because the search for the
original intent of the Religion Clauses-as based on the evidence from
national politics and prominent figures in national debates-has proven
22inconclusive, the Supreme Court has looked beyond national politics to
state law and politics from the period roughly contemporaneous with the
drafting of the Religion Clauses for guidance. This approach is based
upon the belief that the use of terminology in the Bill of Rights was very
likely consistent with the use of the same terms in the states'
constitutions and laws. As Justice O'Connor has articulated, "it is
reasonable to think that the States that ratified the First Amendment
assumed that the meaning of the federal free exercise provision
corresponded to that of their existing state clauses.,
23
The search for the original meaning of the Religion Clauses in
state law and history also arises, at least in part, from the general trend
towards interpreting constitutional provisions in light of their original
24public meaning. As a result of this trend, the "public meaning" or
21. See Steven K. Green, "Bad History": The Lure of History in Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717, 1719 (2006) ("The historical
record is too amorphous and too easily misread or manipulated to resolve modem
controversies. In essence, the very attempt to use history to answer current
constitutional questions is a misuse of the historical craft."); Ravitch, supra note 8, at
112 ("The irony is that, by relying on the dual illusions of historical truth and
neutrality, the earlier Courts set the stage for later courts to undo substantive
protections by simply challenging or altering the historical or neutrality-based
analysis. By failing to rely directly on the rights principles with which it seemed
concerned, the earlier Court set the stage for the destruction of those rights through
the use of a very different conception of history and neutrality ....
22. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
23. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 553 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
24. Numerous scholars have noted both an increase in judicial reliance upon
originalism and a shift in the methods of this approach from original intent to focus
upon the text and the public meaning contemporaneous with drafting and
ratification. Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction
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"public understanding" of state constitutions and laws have taken on new
importance as evidence of the meaning of similar language in the federalS25
Constitution. Even when language employed by state law is distinct
from the language of the Religion Clauses, analysis of the state law
illuminates the use of potential alternative language available to the
framers of the Religion Clauses. Contemporaneous state laws, local
laws, and government practices, presumably thought to be constitutional
under their state constitutions, also become relevant as evidence of the
meaning of the state constitutions. To be clear, no Justice has held that a
state constitution, whether it precisely mirrors the language of the
Religion Clauses or not, is conclusive evidence of the meaning of the
Religion Clauses. Rather, evidence from state legal history serves as
evidence of the public understanding of the terms at the time of the
ratification of the First Amendment.
Given the number of constitutional issues to which the Court or
at least a subset of the Justices applies a historical approach, the
26importance of historical accuracy cannot be overstated. Within the last
twenty years, the Court has consulted founding-era Georgia history for
Distinction: A Useful Fiction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 72-73 (2010) ("Generally
speaking, however, New Originalism explains the theory of American constitutional
interpretation as something of a dual process: First, one must look to the original
public meaning (interpretation) and when that runs out, look to other sources that
might reliably fill out the contours of that interpretation (e.g., history and tradition
surrounding the text, the structure of the text, court precedent, etc.)."). See generally
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are
They Rationalizations for Conservatism?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 5 (2011);
James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism,
97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism,
59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).
25. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional
Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 354 (2011) ("Even the most committed originalists and
textualists use Framing-era state constitutions to interpret the federal document.");
Eric R. Nitz, Note, Comparing Apples to Apples: A Federalism-Based Theory for the
Use of Founding-Era State Constitutions to Interpret the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J.
295, 298 (2011) ("Originalists-who interpret the Constitution historically by
referencing the founding era-have often looked toward founding-era state
constitutional provisions for interpretive guidance. Because these state provisions
contain similar wording to the text of the Constitution, the argument goes, the
Constitution's words must have a similar meaning.").
26. Nitz, supra note 25 (listing the various constitutional provisions for which
the Supreme Court has used founding-era state constitutions to aid in interpretation).
2014] 229
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help in interpreting the First Amendment, 27 Second Amendment, 28
Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Dormant Commerce Clause, 30 and the
constitutional prohibition of state term limits for national legislators.
3
1
The Court has relied the most heavily on the historical approach
in the context of the Second Amendment, particularly in District of
Columbia v. Heller. In Heller the Court overturned a statute limiting
individual firearms use within individual residences. Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, prefaced his exploration of state use of the term
"bear arms" with this explanation: "In interpreting this text, we are
guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal
and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning."3 Justice Scalia
later focused upon state constitutions with phrases similar to those of the
Second Amendment as the "most prominent examples" and the "most
relevant to the Second Amendment.,34 Thus, the Court's holding relied,
in part, upon the finding that its "interpretation is confirmed by
analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and
immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment."35 Similarly,
in McDonald v. City of Chicago,36 in which the Court extended Heller
beyond the District of Columbia and to state firearms laws, Justice Alito,
writing for the Court, and Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, both relied
27. City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 103-05 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
28. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 586 (2008).
29. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 773 n.21, 816 n.3 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), 817 n.4, 842, 844 (2010). This method
has proved attractive to some scholars as well. Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander,
Religion and the Equal Protection Clause. Why the Constitution Requires School
Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909 (2013) (surveying historical data relevant to
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment in light of contemporaneous public
meaning).
30. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
621-22 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
31. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 823-25 (1995); see also
id. at 904-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
32. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-87.
33. Id. at 576 (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
34. Id. at 584.
35. Id. at 600-0 1.
36. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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on state constitutions and state law, as well as state and federal military
orders dating back to the Civil War.37 Because of the incorporation issue
present in McDonald, as opposed to Heller, both Justices relied upon
state history that ranged from the period of the Second Amendment to
that of the Fourteenth Amendment.
38
Reliance on state legal history as an aid to interpretation of the
Constitution has not always been a winning argument. Yet the dissents
in such cases are still useful from an analytical perspective. In their
various dissents, Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia have defended
reliance on state legal history and argued for the wide application of this
approach. For example, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison,39 Justice Thomas relied upon Georgia state newspaper articles
to parse the Constitution-era meaning of "import" to support his
interpretation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.4 0 Likewise, in City of
Chicago v. Morales,41 Justice Thomas cited a string of state laws dating
from the 1760s through the 1790s in support of his First Amendment and
42
Copyright Clause interpretations.
At times, the dissenters have managed to draw a reluctant
majority into a battle over the proper interpretation of state legal history.
For example, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,43 Justice Stevens'
majority opinion questioned the usefulness of historical state law as "a
reliable indicator of the contours of restrictions that the Constitution
, ,44
imposed on States. Despite being unconvinced of the appropriateness
of this method of interpretation, Justice Stevens proceeded to offer his
own differing interpretation of the state constitutional history relied on in
37. Id. at 772-73; see also id. at 817-18, 841-44 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 772-73; id. at 817-18, 841-44 (Thomas, J., concurring); Dist. of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584, 600-01 (2008).
39. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
40. Id. at 621-22.
41. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
42. Id. at 103-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The American colonists enacted
laws modeled upon the English vagrancy laws, and at the time of the founding, state
and local governments customarily criminalized loitering and other forms of
vagrancy."). In the same opinion, Justice Scalia's dissent discusses the differing
approaches to history found in Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court and Justice
Thomas' dissent. Id. at 84-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
44. Id. at 823.
2014]
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Justice Thomas' dissent.45 A careful reading of Thornton illustrates an
important facet of this debate. While the Justices are clearly in the midst
of an ongoing difference of opinion over the correct interpretation and
dispositive value of state legal history, they do not likewise voice any
concern over their collective ability to assess this history. Given the
enormity and complexity of the interpretative issues implicated should
the Court determine to rely on state legal history, their silence on the
feasibility of doing so accurately is troubling.
Certain areas of constitutional law appear unlikely to be affected
by state legal historical analysis. Foremost amongst these is the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment," the
wording of which gives the most textual support to an evolving standards
46approach to interpretation. Moreover, not every use of state legal
history equates to an attempt to parse the meaning of a term used in the
Constitution. For example, in Golan v. Holder,47 Justice Breyer's dissent
referenced the colonial copyright statutes of Georgia and other states, but
he did so to demonstrate the "objective" of the early statutes, rather than
to parse the meaning of terms used in the Copyright Clause and First
48 49Amendment. Similarly, in Deck v. Missouri, the Court's Due Process
analysis required an inquiry into the constitutionality of shackling of
prisoners during the sentencing phase of a criminal trial.5° In order to
determine whether "shackling" was a "deeply rooted tradition," Justice
Breyer, writing for the Court, analyzed early state practices of
"shackling."51 Although the Justice relied on state legal history to reach
the Court's holding, this analysis, like the analysis in Golan, did not seek
to prove the contemporaneous meaning of any terms employed in the
Constitution.
45. Id. at 823-25; see also id. at 904-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (explaining that the
concept of proportionality central to the Eighth Amendment is viewed by the Court
"less through a historical prism than according to 'the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society"'); Scott W. Howe, Slavery as
Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the
Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 984 (2009).
47. 565 U.S. , _ , 132 S. Ct. 873, 901 (2012).
48. Id. at 901.
49. 544 U.S. 622 (2005).
50. Id. at 640-43.
51. Id.
In sum, because interpretation of the Religion Clauses has
proven perennially problematic, the Court has sought to use evidence of
founding-era state treatment of religion. This method of interpretation is
linked to the search for an understanding of the original Constitution as
relevant to, if not conclusive evidence of, the meaning of the Religion
Clauses. Hence, the Court's competence in its efforts to apply state legal
history to the Religion Clauses has bearing upon the merit of this
resource to the broader project of originalism.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, THE RELIGION CLAUSES,
AND GEORGIA
In practice, formidable obstacles stand in the way of using state
legal history to interpret the Religion Clauses. In addition to the
overwhelming size of the task are several complicating factors which are
implicit in the analysis immediately below and which I will focus on in
Part III: the complexity of state history, the condition and accessibility of
historical records, and, in some states, the absence of outspoken
statesmen prolific in the written word.
Despite these obstacles, the Supreme Court has turned to
Georgia legal history for guidance in interpreting the Religion Clauses
five times. In the first three such cases, McGowan v. Maryland,52 Engel
v. Vitale, 3 and County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,
54
the Court correctly cited some Georgia law but was misleading about the
relevance of that law to the holding of the case before the Court. Lack of
precision in analysis of the relevant state law, failure to take into account
state law pointing contrary to the conclusions drawn, and lack of logical
connection between the Georgia law cited and the conclusions drawn
mark these cases as misleading uses of state law. In the Court's most
52. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding that a Sunday closing law does not violate
the Establishment Clause).
53. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that public school prayer violates the Estab-
lishment Clause).
54. 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that a holiday display with decorations of
just one religion does violate the Establishment Clause and finding that a holiday
display including decorations of secular and multiple sectarian significance does not
violate the Establishment Clause).
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recent uses of Georgia history to interpret the Religion Clauses, City of
Boerne v. Flores55 and Locke v. Davey," the Court went further astray.
In Boerne, both Justice Scalia's and Justice O'Connor's opinions failed
to take into account or even note major changes in Georgia's free
exercise provision during the relevant period. In Locke, Justice
Rehnquist ignored relevant changes in Georgia's constitution, omitted
clear counter indications about the meaning of the state constitution in
state law, and misread the plain meaning of the constitutional provision
that he quoted.
Before discussing these uses of Georgia legal history or the
underlying causes of the mistakes in these cases, an overview of the
requisite history is necessary.
A. Georgia Legal History from 1732-1798: Colonial Rule
and Four State Constitutions
The State of Georgia was established by an English royal charter
in 1732 and was the youngest of the original thirteen colonies.57 Despite
its youth, Georgia's legal history is marked with complexity and enough
major upheavals to fully occupy a legal historian, much less a Justice or a
clerk. Since colonial times, Georgia has had a total of eleven
constitutions, and her constitution was in a particularly remarkable state
58of flux during the first decades of independence. Four of Georgia's
constitutions fall within the period relevant to interpretation of the
Religion Clauses: the state constitutions of 1776, 1777, 1789, and 1798,
which was the first new Georgia constitution after the ratification of the
Bill of Rights.59
55. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
violates the separation of powers).
56. 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (holding that a state statute which withheld public
scholarships from students based on their choice to study devotional theology was
not a violation of Free Exercise Clause).
57. KENNETH COLEMAN, Frontier Haven: Georgia and the Bill of Rights, in
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES 443 (Patrick T. Conley & John P Kaminski eds., 1992).
58. See "Georgia Constitutions Introduction," GEORGIA INFO (An Online
Georgia Almanac) available at http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/gacontoc.htm.
59. Id.
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The first major transition in Georgia's governance occurred
before the Revolutionary War. When the colony failed to prove
lucrative, it was returned to the Crown, and a royal governor and the
Church of England soon arrived. Subsequently, in 1762, the colony
enacted "Sunday" laws, "for preventing and punishing Vice,
Profaneness, and Immorality, and for keeping holy the Lords day,
commonly called SUNDAY.", 61 The law required that all persons
observe the Sabbath, though-as would often be the case with Georgia
establishment in the years to come-the law permitted individual
selection of denomination.
[Every person] whatsoever, shall on every Lords
day, apply themselves to the observation of the
same, by exercising themselves thereon, in the
duties of Piety and true Religion publickly [sic] or
privately, or having no reasonable or lawful
excuse, on every Lords day shall resort to their
Parish Church, or some meeting or Assembly of
Religious Worship, Tolerated and allowed by the
Laws of England, and there shall abide, orderly and
soberly during the time of prayer and preaching, on
62
pain of forfeiture for every neglect....
In addition to requiring worship on Sunday, the law prohibited
commerce, legal business, travel, public eating and drinking, and games
on Sunday. 63 Violators were to be fined and, at the discretion of the
Justice of the Peace, goods related to a violation could be seized and the
violator set in the stocks for up to two hours.64
60. ALBERT BERRY SAYE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA: 1732-
1945,45-48 (1948).
61. 18 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 508-515 (Allen D.
Chandler ed., 1910).
62. Id. at 508.
63. Id. at 511-12.
64. Id.
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The next major transition took place fourteen years later when
the British government was forced out of Georgia.65 Georgia's interim
governing body, the Provincial Congress, adopted a temporary
66constitution. The temporary constitution, entitled "Rules and
Regulations of 1776," went into effect in April of 1776 and was intended
as only a temporary measure to bridge the gap between the desertion of
Georgia by her colonial government and the opportunity to draft a more
67permanent governing document. Called a "pre-constitution" by one
historian,68 this thirteen-paragraph constitution set forth only the bare
essentials for the new government and provided that all prior laws
"which do not interfere with the proceedings of the Continental or our
Provincial Congresses ... shall be in full force, validity, and effect until
otherwise ordered. ' 69 No legislative history, drafting notes, or journals
appear to have been kept or to have survived to aid in interpretation of
this constitution.70 Historians do not tell that any such records were ever
drafted, and it appears doubtful that even archival research could uncover
71any useful records.
The constitution of 1776 includes no religious provisions and no
protections of individual liberties. Given the temporary nature of this
constitution, it is possible that Georgia had yet to determine her position





69. GA. CONST. of 1776, § 4. This language could be interpreted to mean that
all preexisting laws touching on religion were still in effect; indeed, this is doubtless
the intent, with the exception of the establishment of the Anglican Church.
70. To the extent that the legal and general histories of Georgia reviewed
discuss the Rules and Regulations of 1776, they do not indicate that any legislative
or drafting notes or journals were kept or are still in existence. Though I did not find
any historians affirmatively concluding that no such record exists, I think it is a
reasonable conclusion that one of the many treatises I reviewed would have
mentioned such a document were it in existence. Correspondence with the
University of Georgia School of Law's reference librarians confirmed that they
could find record of no journals, notes, or other materials, archival or otherwise, kept
during the drafting of the Georgia Constitution of 1776. University of Georgia
reference librarians are available for consultation and may be contacted via their
website: www.lawsch.uga.edu/law-library.
71. See supra note 70.
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on religion, let alone what precise language would best express that
position. Thus, the omission of the entire topic of religion, given the
omission of all individual rights in the document as a whole, should be
attributed to the volatility of the era, not any specific religious viewpoint.
By 1777, this had changed. The new government drafted a
comprehensive constitution that reflected the greater time and thought
which its framers were able to supply. The impetus to the drafting and
adoption of this constitution was the Declaration of Independence, and
the new constitution was drafted intermittently because of the demands
72
of the war between November of 1776 and February of 1777. As with
the earlier "pre-constitution," no journal or drafting notes, if they were
ever kept, survive.73 The only record at all, which is only available in
state archives, merely notes who was present and that the convention
modeled its work on the new federal constitution. History thus
provides little assistance to the interpretation of this constitution.
This new constitution, containing a four-paragraph preamble and
sixty-three articles, describes the branches of the new government in
greater detail and includes many provisions intended to protect
75
individual liberties. No less than ten provisions touch on religion, some
promoting the establishment of religion and others protecting freedom of
72. COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 453; see also REBA CAROLYN STRICKLAND,
RELIGION AND THE STATE IN GEORGIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 161-86 (1939),
for a discussion of questions concerning lands held by churches under British
authority, a detailed analysis of the interrelationship of politics and religion during
the Revolutionary War, and an excellent overview of the religious affiliations of the
early Georgia colonists.
73. Ware's Constitutional History of Georgia reports that a fragment of
minutes from the meeting had been found in later years. ETHEL K. WARE, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GEORGIA 30 (1947). This fragment, however, is held
by Pierpont Morgan Library, in New York, New York, which assists with research
by appointment only and does not keep their holding available for online or
electronic review. The Pierpont Morgan Library can be contacted via its website:
www.themorgan.org. Further research, including correspondence with the University
of Georgia School of Law's reference librarians, revealed that this is the only known
copy of this record (which apparently has not been duplicated or incorporated into
any of the compilations of Georgia records). University of Georgia reference
librarians are available for consultation and may be contacted via their website:
www.lawsch.uga.edu/law-library.
74. WARE, supra note 73, at 30.
75. GA. CONST. of 1777.
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76
conscience and worship. Free exercise related provisions included an
article providing for freedom of conscience for jury members77 and a free
exercise provision not unlike that of the First Amendment. The free
exercise provision provided that "[a]ll persons whatever shall have the
free exercise of their religion; provided it be not repugnant o the peace
and safety of the State.78 With free exercise limited by the peace and
security of the state, this phrasing implicitly indicated that free exercise
at a minimum includes some external acts.
Far from rejecting religious establishment altogether, this first
full-fledged Georgia constitution required that all members of the
legislature and the state governor, by virtue of being required to be a
member of the legislature, "shall be of the Protestant."7 9 This is the only
clause of the constitution that designates a specific religion, but a number
of clauses contribute to the establishment of nondenominational theism.
80
To this effect, an oath ending in "so help me God" was dictated for
legislators and governors taking office, voters, and those about to hear
81secret information. Similarly, "Deus" ("God") is referred to in the
82description of the state seal.
Perhaps the most revealing establishment provision is related to
the payment of teachers. Article LVI provided that no person shall be
76. A provision which prohibited any clergyman from being "allowed a seat in
the legislature" is difficult to categorize. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXII. While this
could be perceived as an anti-religious provision, it seems more likely that it was
intended to protect those of minority beliefs from the possibility of persecution from
a legislature filled with majority-favored clergymen.
77. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XLIII. This provision, setting forth the role of
jury members, provided for freedom of conscience. Though jury members were
required to bring in a verdict "according to law," they were permitted an exception if
such a verdict was "repugnant" to conscience. Thus, when faced with a conflict
between conscience and the law, jury members were constitutionally authorized to
follow their consciences. While this provision was facially neutral, it would be of
significance to jury members whose religious beliefs made application of a law
antithetical to their faith.
78. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI (emphasis added).
79. GA. CONST. of 1777, art VI.
80. GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. VI, XIV, XV, XXIV, XXX, LVII.
81. GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. XIV, XV, XXIV, XXX. The required
oath contained an alternative for voters (as opposed to members of the government)
who were permitted to make an affirmation rather than an oath.
82. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVII.
required to "support any teacher or teachers except those of their own
profession."83 By implication, this Article demonstrates that taxpayers
could be required to support teachers of their own religion and that
religion was an important aspect of a state-employed teacher's job.84 In
other words, schools were at least implicitly understood to be in the
service of religion. In 1783, Governor Lyman Hall appealed to the state
legislatures to combine efforts to educate and increase piety, pleading for
educational institutions that could "restrain vice and encourage virtue."
85
Likewise, state legislator Abraham Baldwin worked for the passage of
several acts that encouraged education and religion in tandem.86 He
argued that "[i]t should therefore be among the first objects of those who
wish well to the National prosperity to encourage and support the
principles of Religion and Morality." 87 During this period, both
proposed and enacted legislation related to education is notable for its
professed goal of encouraging religion and its neutrality amongst
88Protestant religions. In 1785, the Georgia legislature passed an act
establishing a tax for the support of religion.s This act provided that
when a designated number of residents subscribed to a given minister,
the minister would then be paid from state funds.90 The act also affirmed
that the different sects and denominations of the Christian religion "were
to 'have free and equal liberty and toleration in the exercise of their
religion."' 91 Thus, it seems that state support for and promotion of
religion was the policy of the day. Yet establishment was limited, and
the use of state funds to promote one religion over another was coupled
83. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI.
84. Id.
85. LYMAN HALL, "Message from His Honor the Governor to the Honorable
House of Assembly" (1783), in 2 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 61, at 512-513;
Keith Whitescarver, Creating Citizens for the Republic: Education in Georgia,
1776-1810, 13 J. EARLY REPUBLiC 458 (1993).
86. Whitescarver, supra note 85, at 458-62 (chronicling the education-related
religious legislation proposed and enacted during the period between the 1777 and
1789 constitutions).
87. Id. at 459.
88. Id. at461.
89. COLEMAN, supra note 65, at 454.
90. Id.
91. Id. at454-55.
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with protections that permitted each taxpayer to limit the religion to
which his taxes would be allocated.
The ratification of the United States Constitution spurred the
next major event in Georgia constitutional history. 92  The national
Constitution arrived in Georgia on October 10, 1787.9 By January 2,
1788, twenty-six Georgia delegates unanimously ratified the
Constitution, making Georgia the fourth state to do so.94 The Georgia
legislature resolved that revisions of its own constitution should be made
as soon as the necessary nine states had ratified the national
Constitution. 95 The Georgia convention met for sixteen days in
November of 1788.96 As at the other state constitutional conventions of
this era, no journal that is known to historians survived, and very little
has ever been brought to light about which issues were mostS 97
contentious. The only record at all, which is only available in state
archives, merely notes who was present and that the convention modeled
its work on the new federal Constitution. 98 Indeed, the resulting
document shows a marked tendency to harmonize with the new federalS • 99
Constitution. This is perhaps most notable in the structure of the new
state constitution, which altogether abandoned its prior organization in
favor of a branch-by-branch structure mimicking that of the United
States Constitution. The new Georgia Constitution went into effect in
May of 1789, before the first Congress met and drafting of the First
Amendment commenced.00
Substantive changes in Georgia's new constitution lessened
some of the establishment elements. For example, religious tests for the
legislature were removed, and "[s]o help me God" was deleted from
oaths and affirmations.01 Similarly, the article specifying the state seal
was removed and with it the provision specifying that the state seal
92. SAYE, supra note 60, at 132-37; WARE, supra note 73, at 60-61.
93. SAYE, supra note 60, at 132.
94. SAYE, supra note 60, at 133; WARE, supra note 73, at 60.
95. WARE, supra note 73, at 61.
96. SAYE, supra note 60, at 137; WARE, supra note 73, at 61.
97. SAYE, supra note 60, at 137; WARE, supra note 73, at 61.
98. SAYE, supra note 60, at 137; WARE, supra note 73, at 61.
99. SAYE, supra note 60, at 137; WARE, supra note 73, at 65.
100. WARE, supra note 73, at 63-64.
101. See generally GA. CONST. of 1789.
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appeal to God.' Moreover, with the deletion of the entire article on the
role of juries, the right not to render a verdict contrary to conscienced. 03
disappeared. As in the Constitution of 1777, "[n]o clergyman of any
denomination" was permitted to "be a member of the General
Assembly."
104
On the other hand, the free exercise clause underwent major
revisions and read as follows: "All persons shall have the free exercise of
religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support of any
religious profession but their own."'10 5 All persons were still to have
"free exercise of their religion," but in the new version this protection
was broadened through the removal of the language that limited the
protection to actions not repugnant to the peace and safety of the state.
The deletion of the language from the prior version can hardly be taken
as accidental, and it seems that under the new provision exercise of
religion was protected even if repugnant to the peace and safety of the
state. The second revision of this article modified the clause prohibiting
forced support of teachers so that no one should be "obliged to contribute,,106
to the support of any religious profession but their own, evidencing
that at least one element of establishment-even if nondenominational or
non-preferential-remained.
In sum, the changes in the 1789 constitution resulted in less
establishment elements, with state support of religion permitted only
with the consent of the individual to be taxed. But it also broadened the
protections for exercise of religion, removing the requirement that
protected activities not interfere with the peace and safety of the state.
The implication from this change in language was that practicing one's
religion was constitutionally protected even when in violation of laws of
general applicability.
Georgia's next constitution was ratified in 1798 and is very
similar to that of 1789: it has a similar organization, although the
preamble from the 1789 version was completely omitted, and it
continues along the same trajectory in many respects in its treatment of
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. 1, § 18. The wording of this provision was
unchanged from the prior version.
105. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5.
106. Id.
20141
242 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
religion.10 7 Like the 1789 Constitution, God remains absent from oath
and affirmation, and there are no religious tests for office.' °8 Again, the
constitution is silent on the role of juries, and again the constitution does
not set forth the contents or motto for a state seal.109
The major changes in the treatment of religion in the 1789
Constitution are twofold. First, the prohibition against ministers serving
as legislators was removed. Second, the only remaining article on
religion was reworded so that it does not at all resemble the prior
declaration that "[a]ll persons shall have the free exercise of religion,
without being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious
profession but their own.'. The resulting religious provision of the
1798 Constitution reads as follows:
No person within this State shall, upon any
pretense, be deprived of the inestimable privilege
of worshipping God in a manner agreeable to his
own conscience, nor be compelled to attend any
place of worship contrary to his own faith and
judgment; nor shall he ever be obliged to pay
tithes, taxes, or any other rate, for the building or
repairing any place of worship, or for the
maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary
to what he believes to be right, or hath voluntarily
engaged to do. No one religious society shall ever
be established in this State, in preference to
another; nor shall any person be denied the
enjoyment of any civil right merely on account ofS •• 112
his religious principles.
This new article in the Georgia Constitution welcomed a cluster of new
rights and introduced subtle changes in pre-existing provisions.




111. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5.
112. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10.
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Two phrases in the above paragraph have proven to be
significant in subsequent Supreme Court opinions and require careful
parsing. First, the establishment provision limiting the use of state funds
in support of religion is significantly altered. 113 On the one hand,
taxation for religious spending was more explicitly limited to exclude all
citizens except those who volunteered to pay the tax. The provision also
clearly provides for state use of funds for the payment of ministers and
the building and repair of "places of worship."
Second, the 1798 free exercise provision also underwent changes
that left it narrower in one regard and broader in another. The new
clause specified that no one shall be deprived of "worship" "on any
pretence whatsoever." 114 This change narrowed the provision by
substituting "free exercise," found in the 1777 and 1789 versions, with
"worship." At the same time, the protection of worship, which had
already been strengthened in the 1789 version through the omission of
the earlier limitation for peace and safety, was further bolstered by the
emphatic language prohibiting interference "on any pretence
whatsoever."
11 5
After the adoption of the 1798 Constitution, Georgia did not
adopt a new constitution until 1861. Thus, the 1798 Constitution-the
first constitution drafted after the adoption of the Bill of Rights and the
last constitution drafted during the era of the founding generation-is the
last Georgia Constitution relevant to interpreting the Bill of Rights in
light of the understanding of the times in which it was written.
B. Three Cases of Insufficient History
Evidence contemporaneous with the drafting of the First
Amendment indicates that Georgia law encompassed limited state action
intended to further religion. In the three following cases, Justices Black,
Stevens, and Frankfurter consistently omit or controvert the most
relevant pieces of Georgia's history relative to their arguments.
113. Id. ("[N]or shall [anyone] ever be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other
rate, for the building or repairing any place of worship, or for the maintenance of any
minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or hath voluntarily




Although they each cite some facts of Georgia legal history accurately,
they use this history torn from context and without reference to whether
Georgia law as a whole supports their argument.
In Engel v. Vitale,"6 in which the Court held that government-
directed prayer in public schools violated the Establishment Clause,1
17
Justice Black referred to Georgia as one of the colonies in which, under• 118
British rule, the Church of England had been established. But Justice
Black also claimed, without any citation to Georgia history, that "the
successful Revolution against English political domination was shortly
followed by intense opposition to the practice of establishing religion by
law."119 The Justice further supports his claim with a discussion of
American history, in which he makes sweeping claims about the anti-
religious developments in the new states but cites specifics only from
Virginia. 
120
Narrowly construed, Justice Black's statement about rejection of
establishment is correct: Georgia, once freed from the Anglican Church,
did not establish one official state religion. But full establishment of an
official state church was not at issue in Engel. At issue in Engel was the
consistency of school prayer with the states' historical treatment of
religion. With the issue thus framed-and in light of a fuller grasp of
Georgia history-it becomes evident that Justice Black omits much
relevant Georgia history. Georgia's constitution required all state
legislators and the state governor to be Protestant for more than a decade
during the post-war period."' Likewise, throughout the period relevant
to interpretation of the Religion Clauses, Georgia's Constitution and laws
provided taxpayer support for churches and religious instruction in
schools. Indeed, state schools were viewed as important vehicles for
116. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
117. Id. at 427-28.
118. Id. at 429.
119. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 428-29.
121. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. VI.
122. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI; GA. CONST. of 1789, art. I, § 18;
GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10.
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inculcating piety in young Georgian citizens. 123 Although these
provisions do not amount to the official establishment of a state church,
this history does demonstrate that elements of establishment were
constitutionally mandated, particularly with regard to schools.
Therefore, with regard to Georgia, Justice Black's claim that the Religion
Clauses were welcomed by a nation of states hostile to establishment is
either irrelevant, because state establishment was not before the Court, or
misleading, insofar as Georgia did have significant elements of
establishment-particularly in its use of schools-during the relevant
period. At best, Justice Black's reliance on one accurate fact of Georgia
history does little to advance his argument.
Justice Black's citation to Georgia's legal history is followed by
a crucial but unsupported claim about development within the 
states.124
This pivotal claim, that the First Amendment was ratified by a nation of
states hostile to the establishment of religion, seems by implication to be
supported by Georgia developments. But the careful reader observes that
Georgia developments are no longer cited, and the informed reader
knows Justice Black's claim can no longer be fairly understood as
consistent with Georgia history. Not only is Justice Black misleading as
to the content of Georgia history, but his historical analysis strays from
the issue before the Court.
Similarly, in McGowan v. Maryland, 121 the Court used state
history in an equally cursory and misleading fashion.126 Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the Court, upheld a Maryland Sunday closing law
127
without relying on Georgia history. Justice Frankfurter's lengthy
concurrence, on the other hand, extensively explored the history of state
Sunday closing laws and specifically cited Georgia's colonial Sunday
123. Whitescarver, supra note 85, at 458-62 (chronicling the education-related
religious legislation proposed and enacted during the period between the 1777 and
1789 constitutions).
124. Engel, 370 U.S. at 428.
125. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
126. For a fuller discussion of the Court's holding and its implications within
the context of Sunday closing law jurisprudence, see Franklin E. Bondonno, First
Amendment Right and Sunday Closing Laws, 31 LINCOLN L. REV. 51 (2003-04).
127. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 423.
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closing law. ' 28 In his opinion, Justice Frankfurter argued that, while
Sunday closing laws may initially have been largely religious, they
developed into a non-religious practice in the states.129
To support the historical narrative which preceded this
conclusion, Justice Frankfurter discussed colonial Sunday closing laws
and cited Georgia's 1762 colonial Sunday-closing law to support the
proposition that the "earlier among the colonial Sunday statutes were
unquestionably religious in purpose."' 30 The paragraph supporting this
claim included two brief quotes from the Georgia law in question and a
citation to the statute. 131 Besides this cursory treatment of Georgia
history, Justice Frankfurter included similarly brief discussions of the
Sunday closing laws of nine other colonies.' Justice Frankfurter then
argued that, after the Revolution, although complete separation of church
and state had not been realized "[o]ther States were fast approaching that
ideal, however, and everywhere the spirit of liberty in religion was in the
ascendant."133 Having admitted some degree of establishment in the
early years of the nation, he asserts, "even the seventeenth century
legislation does not show an exclusively religious preoccupation.,
1 34
Here and indeed as he continues to illustrate his vision of the
development of Sunday closing laws towards becoming secular in
purpose, Justice Frankfurter altogether omits all citation or reference to
Georgia. Although Justice Frankfurter draws generalized conclusions,
there are no additional references to Georgia law, history, or politics
dating after the Revolutionary War.
128. Id. at 459-551 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Georgia's colonial
Sunday closing law at 488 n.49 & 489 n.56).
129. Id. at 507 ("For to many who do not regard it sacramentally, Sunday is
nevertheless a day of special, long-established associations, whose particular temper
makes it a haven that no other day could provide.").
130. Id. at 487, 488 n.49.
131. Id. at 487-88.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 486. Justice Frankfurter does qualify the relevance of this history to
his ultimate interpretation, admitting that colonial and pre-First Amendment state
law is "not in itself, of course, indicative of the purpose of those laws, or of their
consistency with the guarantee of religious freedom which the First Amendment,
restraining the power of the central Government, secured. Most of the States were
only partially disestablished in 1789." Id.
134. Id. at 489.
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Justice Frankfurter's concurrence omits any discussion of the
development of Georgia law and thus does not support the claim about
the non-sectarian development of Sunday closing laws on which his
opinion rests. The one Georgia law that he cites, an uncontrovertibly
sectarian law dating from the Colonial period, is accurate, but it cannot-
as a matter of logic--demonstrate that the nation's Sunday closing laws
developed into a non-sectarian phenomenon. Because Justice
Frankfurter's opinion failed to reference any Georgia law supporting his
argument that Sunday closing laws became non-sectarian in nature, he
fails to show that Georgia history supports the conclusion. Nor does he
either argue that Georgia was an outlier or admit his omission of
additional Georgia evidence. Thus, his citation of Georgia law, while not
wrong, misleads readers into thinking that Georgia history supports his
overarching conclusion. Rather, Georgia history serves as a gloss,
providing only the feel of historical support without genuinely adding the
weight of history to Justice Frankfurter's conclusion.
The dissent in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union1 35 follows a similar pattern. In Allegheny, the Court considered
the soundness of two "holiday" displays under the Establishment
Clause.136 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, upheld a menorah
display, which included non-Jewish decorations, but found a nativity-
focused scene impermissible. 137 Unlike Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stevens' opinion relied on Georgia history.138 In a partial dissent, Justice
Stevens found both the nativity scene and the menorah unconstitutional
because "[t]he overall display thus manifests governmental approval of
the Jewish and Christian religions."'3 9 To reach his conclusion, Justice
Stevens consulted "[r]elations between church and state" at the time of
the drafting and ratification of the First Amendment.14 Justice Stevens
prefaced his historical inquiry by explaining that it was "appropriate to
reexamine the text and context of the Clause to determine its impact" on
the case before the Court.
141
135. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
136. Id. at 578.
137. Id. at 579.
138. Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
139. Id at 654.
140. Id. at 646-47.
141. Id.
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Justice Stevens proceeded to argue that by the late 1780s, "some
States had repealed establishment laws altogether, while others had
replaced single establishments with laws providing for nondiscriminatory, ,142
support of more than one religion. In his only specific reference to
Georgia law and history, Justice Stevens supported his claim with a
footnote that included a reference to Georgia and five other states. In
this footnote, he argued that the states mentioned therein had become
"comprehensive or 'multiple' establishment" states where "aid was
provided to all churches in each state on a nonpreferential basis, except
that the establishment was limited to churches of the Protestant religion
in three states and to those of the Christian religion in the other three
states.
, 143
Justice Stevens' opinion next argued that "[i]t is against this
historical backdrop" that the Establishment Clause was adopted for the
purpose of rejecting multiple establishment. 144 Based on legislative
history demonstrating that the proposed wording of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses was altered from one prohibiting the establishment of
an official national church to its eventual wording, Justice Stevens
argued that this evolution of the proposed language indicates that
multiple establishments, like that of Georgia, were considered and
rejected by the First Congress.145 Justice Stevens thus wrote that "even in
those States and even among members of the established churches, there
was widespread opposition to multiple establishments because of the
social divisions they caused.,146 No evidence regarding this widespread
opposition is cited. Much less does Justice Stevens note or discuss the
relevance of the many ways in which Georgia endorsed multiple
establishment during the relevant period.
Justice Stevens used Georgia accurately for historical backdrop,
but he omitted the causal link between the backdrop and his conclusion.
His initial categorization of Georgia's early support of religion was a
logical treatment of the elements of establishment present in the state
during the era in which the Religion Clauses were written and adopted.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 646 n.1.
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Unfortunately, the conclusion that he drew from this evidence is not as
sound as the history which he cited. After drawing a generalized
conclusion about the rejection of multiple establishment at the national
level, Justice Stevens then failed to support his claim that multiple
establishment caused social division in states like Georgia.147 Indeed,
Justice Stevens' claim with regard to multiple establishment states is
directly contrary to the evidence from Georgia, where the 1780s saw an
increase in the use of public schools to promote religion and
constitutional clarifications emphasizing the constitutionality of using
state funds to pay the salaries of ministers and to build and repair
churches. 148
In Allegheny, the pattern that emerged in Engel and McGowan
continued. In each of these opinions, the narrowness of the Georgia
history relied on belies the greater context of both the development of the
law in Georgia and the use of this history within the Justices' opinions as
a whole. Whether by failing to provide a fuller picture of that history or
through failure to connect the history cited to the conclusions drawn,
each of these opinions represents a misuse of state legal history. In order
to genuinely ground these opinions in state legal history, both a richer
reference to history and a stronger focus upon its implications to the
question before the Court would have been necessary. Subsequent
Justices have fared no better.
C. Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor, and the Complexity of
Georgia History
One might expect that when Justices have disagreed with one
another about the meaning and implications of historical Georgia law at
least one of them would have used it with a fair degree of accuracy.
Unfortunately, City of Boerne v. Flores149 demonstrates that this is not
true. In Boerne, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Religious
147. Id. at 647-48.
148. Whitescarver, supra note 85, at 458-62 (chronicling the education-related
religious legislation proposed and enacted during the period between the 1777 and
1789 constitutions); GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10.
149. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). 150 With RFRA, Congress
attempted to redefine the parameters of religious freedom under the Free
Exercise Clause in response to the Court's opinion in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 151
Despite Congress's best effort to reinterpret the Free Exercise Clause, in
Boerne the Court effectively returned the law to Smith and invalidated
RFRA with respect to its applicability to the States.152 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the Court, concluded that "RFRA contradicts vital principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance."53
While Justice Kennedy's opinion did not rely on Georgia history or law,
Justice Scalia's partial concurrence and Justice O'Connor's dissent did.
Justice Scalia argued that RFRA's protection of exceptions to
general laws for religious practices was not constitutionally valid
because such exemptions "depart[] from the understanding reflected in
various statutory and constitutional protections of religion enacted by
Colonies, States, and Territories.1 54 Justice Scalia then made two claims
about early free exercise enactments, only one of which is well grounded
in Georgia law. 155 First, he cited the "Georgia Constitution," without
specifying which of her four constitutions from that period, along with
other state constitutions and acts, for the proposition that "the early 'free
exercise' enactments . . . protect only against action that is taken 'for' or
'in respect of religion." 156 Based on this evidence, Justice Scalia
concluded that it is "eminently arguable that application of neutral,
generally applicable laws of the sort the dissent refers to-such as zoning
laws . . . would not constitute action taken 'for,' 'in respect of,' or 'on
150. For a more complete discussion of Boerne, RFRA, and the ramifications
of this case, see Eugene Gressman, RFRA: A Comedy of Necessary and Proper
Errors, 21 CARDoZO L. REV. 507 (1999).
151. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512 ("Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to
the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith."). See also Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding that there was no constitutionally required exemption from a drug
law that would permit the use of peyote for religious purposes).
152. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527.
153. Id. at 536.
154. Id. at 538 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
155. Id. at 538-39.
156. Id.
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account of one's religion.'' ' 157 As qualified by Justice Scalia, this claim
is correct with regard to Georgia; nothing in her history or any of her
early constitutions indicates that the free exercise provisions were
intended to require an exemption from statutes of general applicability,
such as zoning regulations, for religious bodies or practices.
Justice Scalia's second reference to Georgia is a different story.
Again referencing the early state constitutions, Justice Scalia claimed
that the "most plausible reading of the 'free exercise' enactments [of the
states] ... is ... [that] [r]eligious exercise shall be permitted so long as it
does not violate general aws governing conduct."'58 In support of this
claim, Justice Scalia quoted and cited the "Georgia Constitution."'159 By
checking his quotation against the four possible Georgia constitutions of
the era, it is possible to determine that it is the 1777 version to which he
refers. This version indicates, as one would expect from his argument,
that free exercise protection is limited to actions that were "not repugnant
to the peace and safety of the State."'
6 °
But Justice Scalia never notes that, just twelve years after the
implementation of the constitution which he quotes and before the Bill of
Rights was written, Georgia omitted the very language upon which he
relies. Unlike the 1777 version which Justice Scalia quotes, the 1789
Georgia constitution provided for a simple protection of free exercise
without qualification related to keeping the peace. "All persons shall
have the free exercise of religion."' 61 Given his failure to note this 1789
development, it is not surprising that he also omitted reference to the yet
more emphatic language of the 1798 Georgia constitution: "No person
within this State shall, upon any pretence, be deprived of the inestimable
privilege of worshipping God in a manner agreeable to his own
,162conscience .... " If the 1789 omission and the 1798 addition to the
Georgia free exercise clause are to be interpreted as having any meaning
157. Id. at 539.
158. Id. (emphasis in original).
159. Id.
160. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI.
161. GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § 5.
162. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10 (emphasis added). It should be noted
that this version narrowed the scope of protected activity from "exercise" to
"worship." The result of this change is a stronger protection for a smaller group of
activities.
20141
252 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W
at all, as the norms of interpretation indicate they should, Justice Scalia's
conclusion is undermined. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how changes in
the state constitution could be more relevant or more directly undermine
Justice Scalia's conclusion from the earlier, and therefore arguably less
relevant, Georgia Constitution of 1777.
In the same opinion, Justice O'Connor's dissent overlooks the
same development in Georgia law. Her dissent departs from Justice
Scalia's view that the Free Exercise Clause does not apply to laws
governing general conduct. Instead, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
Court "[should] return to a rule that requires government to justify any
substantial burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling
state interest and to impose that burden only by means narrowly tailored
to achieve that interest." 163 Her dissent introduced the early state
constitutions to show that the "precise language of these state precursors
to the Free Exercise Clause varied, but most guaranteed free exercise of
religion or liberty of conscience, limited by particular, defined state
interests."'64 Like Justice Scalia, she then cited the 1777 version of the
Georgia constitution,165 but unlike Justice Scalia she concluded that the
"language used in these state constitutional provisions and the Northwest
Ordinance strongly suggests that, around the time of the drafting of the
Bill of Rights, it was generally accepted that the right to 'free exercise'. ,,166
required, where possible, accommodation of religious practice.
There are two Georgia constitutions-the one immediately
before and the one immediately after the adoption of the First
Amendment 67-that support Justice O'Connor's point more forcefully
than the one on which she chose to rely. If used in conjunction with one
another and the 1777 version, these constitutions would have supported
her dissent by showing that Georgia's constitutional alterations
repeatedly expanded this constitutional protection over the relevant
163. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 553.
165. Id. at 554. Although Justice O'Connor does not note that
multiple versions exist, she does at least include the year of the Georgia constitution
that she quotes. Id.
166. Id.
167. The 1789 version, which omitted the exclusion for acts repugnant to the
peace and safety, and the 1798 version, which added "upon any pretence" to its
prohibition against interference with worship.
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period. Like Justice Scalia's concurrence, Justice O'Connor's dissent
completely ignored the fact that the Georgia constitution changed
dramatically on this point at the relevant time. For Justice Scalia, this
oversight resulted in an overstatement about the probative value of
Georgia law for his position. For Justice O'Connor, the mistake cost her
a significant supporting argument.
Examining Justice Scalia's and Justice O'Connor's mistakes
together, Boerne reinforces the point that the sound use of state law
requires a solid grounding in state legal history. Justice Scalia's reliance
on Georgia's constitution, while not without factual basis, undermined
his conclusion because he overlooked the complex nature of the state's
constitutional history and ignored changes to the constitution that
removed the language on which he based his argument. Justice
O'Connor's opinion suffers from the same failure to discover the
complexity of state history and to cite the most relevant version of the
Georgia constitution. In Justice O'Connor's dissent, this mistake results
in an opinion weakened by an omission of strong evidence that could
have supported her conclusion on the issue before the Court in Boerne.
In both cases, the failures of the Justices to capture complex history
result in a failure to accurately rely on Georgia law and history in support
of their interpretation of the Religion Clauses.
D. Justice Rehnquist, Plain Text, and the Big Picture
Locke v. Davey,168 the most recent case in which the Supreme
Court relied on Georgia history to interpret the Religion Clauses, repeats
the Court's earlier errors in its failure to take into account the complexity
and legal context of Georgia constitutional history. In Locke, the Court
upheld a Washington state law that withheld scholarships from students
based on their choice to study devotional theology as opposed to any
other field. 169 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
surveyed early state practices, including Georgia constitutional
168. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
169. Id. at 715. For a more detailed analysis of this case and its ramifications
on Establishment Clause law, see Richard F. Duncan, Locked Out: Locke v. Davey
and the Broken Promise of Equal Access, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 699 (2006).
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provisions. 70 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that "[m]ost States that
sought to avoid an establishment of religion around the time of the
founding placed in their constitutions formal prohibitions against using
tax funds to support the ministry."1 71 The string citation following this
claim commences with a citation to the Georgia constitution of 1789 and
a quotation of the constitutional language.172 On its face, this citation
demonstrates the inaccuracy of the claim for which the Chief Justice had
just cited it: "All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without
being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but
their own."' 173 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded his set of state law
constitutional citations with the clearly inconsistent claim that the "plain
text of these constitutional provisions prohibited any tax dollars from
supporting the clergy."
'1 74
On its face, the Georgia provision that Chief Justice Rehnquist's,, ,,175
cited provides for taxation in support of "religious profession. This is
manifestly not a prohibition on the use of tax dollars in support of clergy
because it only limits the tax dollars of one citizen from being used in
support of the clergy of another.176 Beyond the plain language of the
constitution, a little knowledge of the historical context reinforces the
point. In the 1780s, Georgia had enacted laws with the stated goal of
using education to inculcate piety. 177 Both the 1777 and the 1798
Georgia constitutions clearly envision the use of tax money in support of• I 178
religion, religious teachers, and ministers. Georgia history and law, on
their face and in light of the state's historical practices, belie Chief
170. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id (citing GA. CONST. of 1789 art. IV, § 5) (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. GA. CONST. of 1789 art. IV, § 5.
176. Id.
177. Whitescarver, supra note 85, at 458-62.
178. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVI ("All persons ... shall not, unless by
consent, support any teacher or teachers except those of their own profession."); GA.
CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10 (". .. nor shall he ever be obliged to pay tithes, taxes,
or any other rate, for the building or repairing any place of worship, or for the
maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right or
hath voluntarily engaged to do.").
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Justice Rehnquist's assertions about the meaning of the Georgia
Constitution of 1789 and the use of taxes for the support of ministers.
In sum, no case discussed in this article misapplied Georgia law
as clearly as Locke. Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion about the
meaning of the Georgia Constitution of 1789 was directly controverted
by the text of the constitutional provision from which it was quoted.
Moreover, the laws then in effect and the immediately preceding and
subsequent Georgia constitutions, clearly contemplated the use of
taxpayer funds to pay ministers and others who would teach religion. 79
While neither the language of the 1789 constitution or this additional
evidence is conclusive proof that the Establishment Clause permits
payment of ministers, some argument would be required to show how
these laws could be consistent with the Chief Justice's position. More to
the point, they are altogether irreconcilable with his assertion that no tax
money could be used in Georgia to pay ministers under the 1789
constitution.
III. EXPLAINING THE COURT'S MISTAKES
Having chronicled the Court's misapplications of Georgia law, I
return to the cause of the problem-the complex nature of legal history
and the inherently time-consuming task of researching it. Researching
the precise state of contemporary law on one point in thirteen states is, in
itself, a time consuming task for an experienced, intelligent, and eager
clerk. To say that the historical nature of the research question
compounds the problem does not begin to capture the truth.
The major obstacles to using Georgia legal history when
interpreting the Religion Clauses are (1) the complexity of legal history,
(2) the nature of historical legal records, and (3) the complexity of the
relationship of state history to the national constitution. Although the
specific form that these obstacles take in the state (and colony) of
Georgia are, in a sense, particular to Georgia, cursory consideration of
their nature leads to the conclusion that the enormity of these challenges
is unlikely to be any less even in states where the specifics differ. The
particulars will differ by state, but this too increases the time necessary to
179. Whitescarver, supra note 85, at 458-62.
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research a founding-era question of religion law because the researcher
must learn the sources of information in each state.
Consulting the "Georgia Constitution" is no simple matter.
Georgia executed four different constitutions during its infancy, and
provisions with bearing on religion are scattered about the four
constitutions. To fully understand Georgia's historical treatment of
religion, all of the documents must be read in their entirety. Moreover,
because only two of the four relevant constitutions bear any
organizational resemblance to one another, the researching Justice and
his clerk cannot simply read one version carefully and then check the
relevant clauses and articles in the successive versions. Instead, a
researcher must review the entirety of at least three of the four
constitutions, checking to see, for example, if the provision about the
allocation of taxation for the payment of ministers,18 the requirement
that legislators be Protestant, 182 or the clause granting freedom of
conscience to jurors183 has been altered, deleted, or simply moved. At an
average length of a little less than that of the Constitution of the United
States, skimming the four Georgia constitutions for religion related
provisions-as anyone who has attempted to thoroughly skim that much
contract can attest to-requires more than a negligible amount of time.
Another layer of complexity becomes apparent when one
considers that it is not only the state constitutions that are relevant. The
state and local laws in place under each constitution, presumably
consistent with the state constitution, provide important evidence of the
meaning of the constitutions themselves. In Georgia this is most
powerfully illustrated by the laws for the support of religion and
religious education that were enacted in the 1780s. 18' With this
information, interpretation of the text of the Georgia constitutions
becomes clearer; without it, as the opinions discussed have shown,
interpretation of the Georgia constitutions threatens to become inaccurate
historical flavor.
180. See supra note 58.
181. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. IV, § 10.
182. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. IV.
183. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XLIII.
184. Whitescarver, supra note 85, at 458-62.
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As it would in any contemporary research project, the state and
local law aspect of the research more than doubles the amount of time
that must be invested to retrieve a sound answer. This relates to the
second hurdle to using state historical law to interpret the Religion
Clauses, the nature of historical legal records. Unlike state constitutions,
which are relatively short and of which we have comparatively complete
records, historical state (and local) laws are far more difficult to research.
In Georgia, state level laws are available in old, poorly-indexed volumes
but not online or in any electronically searchable format. To the extent
that local laws may survive, they are not available electronically,
mentioned in the most thorough historical works, or known to the state's
law librarians. Archival research may be able to unearth more, but
clearly this is beyond the scope of what a Justice can have done in any
one state, let alone all thirteen. To further grasp the volume of labor
involved in researching such records, one must also note that the
researcher is often in the time-consuming predicament of trying to prove
a negative (for example, that no state or local ordinances permitted,
required, or banned school prayers or Sunday closing laws). Of course,
answering such questions conclusively is simply not possible, but even
performing the due diligence necessary to rule out the possibility of a
conclusive answer is in itself a difficult task.
The difficulty of researching and sometimes even locating
relevant records applies even at the constitutional level. Keeping in mind
that the record of the national Congressional debate on the wording and
meaning of the Religion Clauses is a scant five pages,185 it should come
as no surprise that we have much less for many relevant state events.
Knowledge of the law's relationship to religion in early Georgia is
severely limited by the lack of official records from this period. While
copies of most of the landmark legal documents, such as the colony
Charter186 and the act establishing the Church of England during the
Colonial Period,"" survive, more quotidian records with the potential to
shed light on how these laws were or were not enforced are lacking. As
185. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES, AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE INTERACTION OF
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 196-200 (2001).
186. Coleman, Frontier Haven, supra note 57.
187. THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 61, at
508-15.
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one can only discover by taking the time to search for them, there are
virtually no surviving records from any of Georgia's state constitutional
conventions and legislative debates from the founding era, and such
fragments as may exist are in state archives.188 Those official court and
legislative records which were made and kept were almost entirely lost
or destroyed during the Revolutionary War or the Civil War. 
189
Even that trusted resource of the common lawyer's tool box,
case law, proves nearly useless. Almost all court records made before
1779 have been lost or destroyed, and there was no systematic attempt to
record or publish judicial decisions until about 1805. 190 Cases that
survive on an ad hoc basis have not been gathered into a comprehensive
resource, published, made available online, or included in legal
databases. 191
The final difficulty in using Georgia legal history as an aid to
interpreting the Religion Clauses is the complexity of the relationship
between the state and national laws, politics, and circumstances. As with
the law in many of the original states, none of the Georgia constitutions
served as a model for the First Amendment; nor does it appear that
Georgia modeled her religious freedom clauses after those of the First
Amendment. Therefore, while some of the phrasing bears a resemblance
to that of federal Constitution, it is not obvious that comparing the
meaning of the Georgia constitution to the national Constitution is a
matter of comparing apples to apples. In some states this obstacle may
be overcome by consulting the public writings of leaders who addressed
the question of how their own state's constitution compared to the
Religion Clauses or what phrasing or provisions should be employed. 92
But in Georgia none of the statesmen active in the passage and debate
188. Such official records as have survived and published can, for the most
part, be found in either Chandler's Colonial Records or The Revolutionary Records
of the State of Georgia. Chandler, comp., REVOLUTIONARY RECORDS (1908); THE
COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 61, at 3-4.
189. THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 61, at 3-
4.
190. WARE, supra note 73, at 53, 91-92.
191. Westlaw's case history of Georgia, for example, dates only to 1846 for
state supreme court cases and 1906 for the state's appeals courts.
192. Virginia, which enjoys the illumination cast by prolific writers James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, is the best example.
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over the First Amendment were likewise active in Georgia. Unlike
Virginia and to some extent Massachusetts and New York, Georgia
history does not enjoy the illumination rendered by leading intellectuals
and politicians whose statements and writings survive to explain their
understandings of various policies.
It is true that in some states the writings of politicians prominent
on both the national and the state level can bring to light interesting
parallels and positions arguably helpful to interpreting the meaning of the
Religion Clauses. Yet even this resource does not lead to a simple
solution.'93 Barring identical language, the applicability of a state debate
on a state provision to a national debate on a national issue is contentious
and difficult. Even when sufficient care is taken to ensure appropriate
use of evidence from state law and politics, a problem of
disproportionate sources of evidence becomes apparent. The public
meaning of the Religion Clauses in the state of Georgia is no less
relevant than that of Virginia, but our ability to discover it is nonetheless
comparatively limited.
To the extent that records in Georgia are missing, an
understanding of how her history bears on the Religion Clauses remains
admittedly incomplete. For example, the absence of drafting records
from her many constitutional conventions leaves unanswerable questions
about the meaning of Georgia's various free exercise clauses. Yet,
insofar as the obstacles to a better understanding of the Religion Clauses
include the labor that it takes to unearth the historical records and apply
them to a case with the requisite precision and accuracy, application of
state legal history to the Religion Clauses may actually be more difficult
in states in which more complete records exist.
All these factors, the complexity of state law across time and
levels of government, the founding-era legal records that are difficult to
find and search, and the complexity of determining the relevance of state
enactments to the Religion Clauses, contribute to the difficulty of
accurately bringing state legal history to bear on Constitutional
193. For example, James Madison's opinion is not a matter of agreement. In
Arizona Christian School Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1436
(2011), Justice Kennedy and Justice Kagan agreed upon the relevance of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments but disagreed about its
meaning relative to interpretation of the Establishment Clause. See Winn, 563 U.S.
at _,131 S. Ct. at 1461.
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interpretation. Most important and easiest to overlook is the immense
investment in time that researching the issues requires because of the
combination of these factors. Even if and when Georgia founding-era
legal history can be determined with sufficient accuracy, it is not the
work of a day to find and interpret it. And even a day's work-because
it implicates twelve additional days' work-is more research time than
the Court can allocate to such a question.
CONCLUSION
The most resounding lesson to be learned from this history and
the cases that attempt to rely upon it is that, if the Court is to rely on state
history at all in its interpretation of the Constitution, it must do so based
on a more thorough understanding of that history. Citing a provision-
whether correctly or not-in support of one's argument is not sound
reasoning when Georgia law as a whole is contrary to a Justice's
argument. The legal history of Georgia's treatment of religion is
complex, shrouded in layers of obscurity, and without a prominent
historical figure to serve as its spokesperson. To gain insight on the
meaning of Georgia history in its own right requires a willingness to
wade through the history and carefully analyze the information we have
and the development that occurred over the relevant period. Even then,
the answers to be found are not simple, but at least they have a basis in
history and law and therefore may help in the search towards an
understanding of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. To use
Georgia history-or the history of any one state-in support of
constitutional interpretation requires no less care.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's task requires a great deal more care
because this process must be repeated thirteen times. To do less,
however, is to risk multiplying the inaccuracies and unsupported
assertions brought to light in this article. Unless the Court (and courts
more generally) can find the resources, either in their own offices or
through new scholarship provided by others, to research thoroughly, they
should cease to rely upon the thin historical evidence that has been used
to date. The obstacles to correctly marshaling history in support of the
Supreme Court's analysis to the many specific questions of applying the
Religion Clauses are great; yet the risks inherent in inadequate use of
history are greater. Under the current circumstances, the Court should
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leave state legal history to the history books and pursue less onerous
approaches to interpretation of the Religion Clauses. In this particular
situation, a little history is worse than none at all.

